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Abstract 
Despite the economic and social significance of crime reduction and criminals’ rehabilitation, 
research evaluating the effects of incarceration on behavior is surprisingly scarce. We conduct 
an experiment with 105 prison inmates and complement it with administrative data in order to 
explore several aspects of their social behavior. We first perform a comprehensive analysis of 
behavior in three economic games, finding evidence of discrimination against a sample from 
outside prison. In addition, our regression analysis reveals that inmates generally become less 
pro-social towards this out-group the longer they remain incarcerated. Finally, we introduce 
and evaluate a priming intervention that asks inmates to reflect on their time spent in prison. 
This intervention has a very sizeable and significant impact, increasing pro-sociality towards 
the out-group. Hence, a simple, low-cost intervention of this sort can have desirable effects in 
promoting rehabilitation and integration into social and economic life after release.  
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1. Introduction 
Fighting crime is among the priorities for any country’s internal affairs. Crime is not only 
detrimental in terms of more insecurity and a lowering of a country’s social capital, but it also 
represents a high direct monetary cost to society. For instance, in the United States, the annual 
cost of crime is estimated in 3 trillion US dollars (Anderson, 2012). The number of incarcerated 
people in the world is more than 10 million, with more than 2.2 million in the US. In terms of 
prison population rates, in the US and in Western European countries there are 698 and 84 
prisoners per 100,000 of national population, respectively. Overall, the world prison population 
has increased by around 20% since 2000 (Walmsley, 2016). This increase is driven by Central 
(over 80%) and South America (145%) and to a lesser extent by the US (14%), while a 
decreasing pattern (by 21%) is seen in Europe. It is also important to highlight the huge 
recidivism rates, which may explain part of the overall increasing rates for crime. US data show 
a non-encouraging recidivist pattern: around two-thirds of ex-convicts were rearrested within 
three years, and three-quarters within five years. Among those who were rearrested within five 
years, 36.8% were arrested within the first six months (Durose et al., 2014).  
In light of the above patterns, it seems crucial to gain a better understanding of how 
prison sentences affect inmates, and to examine ways to promote their rehabilitation and re-
integration into social and economic life. As a matter of fact, rehabilitation and social 
reintegration are – along with retributive justice and deterrence – among the main objectives of 
modern penal systems.  According to the European Court of Human Rights, ‘while punishment 
remains one of the aims of imprisonment, the emphasis in European penal policy is now on the 
rehabilitative aim of imprisonment’.1 But how successful are prison sentences in fostering pro-
social behavior and promoting the future integration of inmates into social and economic life? 
The debate among criminologists about whether prisons have a positive effect on deterring 
inmates’ criminal behavior remains unresolved. Generally speaking, different schools of 
thought have expressed contradictory points of view in this regard (Gendreau et al., 1999). The 
first one is optimistic and claims that, in line with the concepts of specific and general 
deterrence, prison sentences suppress criminal behavior. In support of this view and in 
particular specific deterrence, recent evidence from Norway points towards a preventive effect 
of time spent in prison on subsequent criminal activity and recidivism by individuals and within 
their family and criminal network (Bhuller et al. 2016, 2018). The second goes in the exact 
                                                 
1 See Vinter [GC], supra n 1 at para 115. Here the Grand Chamber referred to Dickson v United Kingdom, supra n 
35 at para 75; and Boulois v Luxembourg ECHR Reports 2012; 55 EHRR 32 at para 83. 
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opposite direction, claiming that prisons promote criminality given the psychologically 
destructive and inhumane conditions (Chen and Shapiro, 2007) and the possibility of acquiring 
new criminal skills from one’s fellow inmates (Bayer et al., 2009). Hence, the discussion over 
the effect of prisons on inmates remains open.2 In any case, more work is needed to understand 
inmates’ social behavior in order to design effective policies to prevent or rehabilitate criminals.  
While this paper is not equipped to provide a conclusive answer on how prison 
sentences affect behavior, it contributes to this discussion by measuring important aspects of 
inmates’ social behavior and by evaluating a simple intervention aimed at increasing pro-
sociality. We present evidence from a series of experiments based on questionnaires and simple 
games that have been extensively used in the economic literature in order to extract various 
aspects of social behavior, namely the Trust Game, the Prisoner’s Dilemma, and the Equality 
Equivalence Test that elicits social preference types (henceforth TG, PD, and EET, 
respectively). The experimental design allows us to address the following topics, which can be 
informative to the relationship between imprisonment and social behavior: First, we perform a 
comprehensive analysis of inmates’ social behavior along the dimensions of pro- and anti-social 
distributional preferences, trust and reciprocity, and cooperation. Second, we search for 
parochial altruism and intergroup discrimination by comparing the behavior of prison inmates 
towards the in-group (other inmates) and the out-group (a sample from outside the prison). We 
believe this is particularly important, given that successful rehabilitation and re-integration will 
require inmates to interact with the out-of-prison population in the future: in that sense, 
discriminatory behavior against the (current) out-group can be worrisome and indicative of 
unfavorable attitudes towards the general population. Finally, our study introduces and 
evaluates a simple psychological priming method at the beginning of the experimental sessions 
with the aim of activating a positive rehabilitation effect: we ask inmates to reflect on their time 
spent in prison and on how it has affected them. The idea behind this intervention is that inmates 
may be driven to think about the rehabilitative purpose of imprisonment and maybe express 
                                                 
2 Some related empirical work has been carried out and provides evidence on the relationship between prison 
conditions and recidivism (Roodman, 2017; Villettaz et al., 2014). For instance, it has been shown in Drago et al. 
(2011) that prison severity does not reduce the probability of recidivism. Instead, it seems that harsh prison 
conditions increase post-release criminal activity. Further work finds little correlation between the length of 
sentences and employment or income (Toch, 1977; Needels, 1996). Experiments have been also conducted in 
prison to study the criminogenic and anti-social behavior of prisoners as well as the effectiveness of rehabilitation 
programs (e.g., Farrington and Welsh 2005; Lipsey and Cullen, 2007). Finally, a few controlled experiments 
evaluate the effect of prison sentences on outcomes such as employment or re-offense rates, by comparing short-
term imprisonment against community service (Killias et al, 2000, 2010). 
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through their decisions in the experimental games a desire or a commitment to become ‘better 
persons’.  
 Our methodology consists of a lab-in-the-field experiment (Harrison and List, 2004) 
with a non-standard subject pool of 105 prison inmates from two prisons, a low and a high-
security one, in Chania, Greece. We complement our experimental data with administrative and 
survey data on prison inmates. Our choice of games (TG, PD, EET) is motivated by the fact 
that the elicited facets of pro-sociality are essential in the time after release for prison and keys 
to a successful rehabilitation. Trust and reciprocity are of particular importance, not only in 
social relationships, but also for professional relationships that are commonly based on 
mutually beneficial gift-exchange (Akerlof, 1982; Fehr et al., 1997). Similarly, many jobs 
require workers to cooperate with each other in teams, and cooperation has been put forward as 
the most essential and defining feature for the organization of modern societies. Importantly, 
economic experiments have demonstrated that cooperation rates measured in standard 
economic games correlate with actual behavior in the field (Fehr and Leibbrandt, 2011; Gneezy 
et al., 2016). Finally, distributional preferences elicited in the EET – such as altruism or 
inequality aversion – have obvious implications for successful social exchange, but can also 
affect domains such as workplace behavior (Putterman, 2006; Rotemberg, 2006) or voting 
decisions (Fisman et al., 2017). 
 The literature in experimental economics studying the behavior of inmates, outlined in 
the next section, is surprisingly limited. Personality inventories and interviews have been 
extensively used by psychologists and criminologists to assess certain aspects of prisoners’ 
personality and individual attitudes (Toch, 1977).  However, their social preferences and 
behavior in interaction within a social group have not been elicited in a systematic and 
controlled way in incentive compatible contexts where inmates could interact either with each 
other or with non-institutionalized subjects. Moreover, we are aware of almost no controlled 
economic experiments sharing our aims of assessing the effect of prison sentences on various 
aspects of social behavior (other than post-release criminal activity measured by recidivism 
rates), and proposing ways of fostering a positive rehabilitation effect such as our priming 
intervention. One exception is a recent paper examining preference stability by evaluating the 
effect of participation in an ‘offender accountability program’ aimed at promoting pro-social 
behavior in a sample of Californian inmates (Maggioni et al., 2018). The findings indicate that 
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participation in this ten-month long program increased trust (but not altruism), hence providing 
an example of a successful intervention in the direction of rehabilitation.3  
Our results reveal that inmates exhibit some degree of discrimination in their behavior: 
they are significantly less reciprocal and less cooperative towards the out-group (people from 
outside the prison) than towards the in-group (other inmates). However, discrimination is not 
present in the sample of inmates that experienced our priming intervention, because the 
intervention has a very large and statistically significantly positive effect on pro-sociality 
towards the out-group in the domains of trust, reciprocity, and cooperation. These findings 
suggest that a simple, low-cost  intervention based on encouraging prison inmates to reflect on 
their incarceration may be an effective tool to promote rehabilitation and a more successful 
integration into social and economic life after release from prison. This intervention could 
easily be integrated into, e.g., counseling sessions routinely offered to prison inmates by trained 
psychologists or social workers. Furthermore, the regression analysis allows us gain some 
insights on how the time spent in prison affects pro-sociality: we find that longer time spent in 
prison is associated with lower cooperation rates towards the out-group, lower benevolence 
when lying ahead of another participant regardless of group, and stronger reciprocity towards 
the in-group. These findings can be useful when assessing the rehabilitation effect of prison 
sentences.   
2. Literature review 
2.1. Economic experiments in prisons 
Prison inmates are a population that has only recently attracted the interest of experimental 
economic research, and only to a very limited extent. Running economic experiments in prisons 
can be challenging, as it requires complicated logistics. However, we believe that economists 
and behavioral scientists have a word to say on the topics we focus on here, and that insights 
from controlled experiments can be of major importance for criminologists and policy makers. 
In this section we present some related literature on the topics of social behavior among 
prisoners, priming, and ostracism.  
                                                 
3 An interesting literature in criminology has used randomized trials in order to evaluate several kinds of 
interventions (such as boot camps, cognitive-behavioral interventions, and therapeutic programs for drug addicts 
and sex offenders) aimed at improving correctional outcomes and reducing recidivism rates. These interventions 
have generally been found to produce at best modest results. A summary is provided in Farrington and Welsh 
(2005). 
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Existing studies have mainly focused their attention on describing the social behavior 
of inmates. Using a dictator game, Birkeland et al. (2014) find no significant differences in 
altruism and no evidence of discrimination between criminals and non-criminals. Additionally, 
in an internet experiment, these authors do not find any difference in the pro-social behavior 
between people with a criminal record and people without. The authors claim that pro-social 
motivation captured by the dictator game is not a sufficient component to explain criminal 
propensity. Similarly, Chmura et al. (2010) find no significant difference in the propensity to 
give in a dictator game between prisoners and an average group of subjects. Those prisoners 
who attend prison school are less likely than the control group to share their endowment, but if 
they do share it, they give considerably more. Particularly those inmates who have the better 
marks and especially those who improve their marks over time are those who give more. To 
some extent contradicting the above findings, Chmura et al. (2016) find that prisoners give 
more than students in a dictator game and they give more to charity than to another prisoner. 
Our findings complement these studies since we use a new method to elicit distributional 
preferences, which does not rely on a one-dimensional index of pro-social motivation, but 
instead uses a choice list in order to classify decision makers into different types (for more 
details on this method, see section 3). 
On the topic of cooperative behavior, Khadjavi and Lange (2013) compare female 
inmates to a sample of students in a simultaneous and a sequential prisoner’s dilemma. 
Interestingly, in the simultaneous version inmates cooperate more than students do. Clark et al. 
(2015) run four cooperative games in the US. They compare their behavior to a sample of the 
general population. Overall, their results show that offenders make lower offers in the 
ultimatum game, cooperate less in the PD, display lower trust and reciprocity in the trust game 
and make lower contributions in the public good game.4  Nese et al. (2018) run an experiment 
in order to provide evidence on cooperation and response to sanctions among different types of 
criminals. They conduct a PD and a third-party punishment game with three different samples: 
students, ‘ordinary criminals’ and Camorristi (Neapolitan ‘Mafiosi’). Their results show that 
Camorra prisoners have a high degree of cooperativeness and a strong tendency to punish free-
riders, as well as a clear rejection of the imposition of external rules even at significant cost to 
themselves. Ordinary criminals are the least cooperative group of participants in this study, 
                                                 
4 It must be noted, however, that the procedures do not meet the standards of experimental economics since subjects 
did not know the identity of the other player who in the end turned out to be the experimenter. 
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lagging behind Camorra prisoners as well as students. On the other hand, ordinary criminals 
and Camorristi punish more than students in the third-party punishment game. 
Khadjavi (2015) tests the effectiveness of deterrence in a German prison by conducting 
two treatments of the so-called Stealing Game. In the first treatment, subjects have the option 
to steal without consequences, whereas in the second treatment they face a potential punishment 
when stealing. His main results show that inmates are less willing to steal when they face the 
possibility of punishment, suggesting that deterrence can mitigate stealing behavior. Overall, 
the studies discussed above suggest that inmates exhibit a largely similar social behavior to that 
of students or groups drawn from the general population in non-strategic settings such as the 
purely distributional choice in the dictator game, while behavior in more interactive games 
differs to varying degrees.  
An interesting recent study by Cohn et al. (2015) uses the coin tossing task (Bucciol and 
Piovesan, 2011) in a Swiss prison to study the effect of priming on inmates’ ethical behavior. 
The results show that inmates cheat more when they are primed by making their criminal 
identity salient. The authors contrast this result with a control group of non-criminals where 
they do not find an effect of priming. Hence, criminals are found to behave differently when 
their criminal identity is activated. Moreover, Cohn et al. (2015) show that cheating rates in the 
experiment correlate with the number of disciplinary offences in prison, lending strong support 
to the external relevance of the experimental findings and the methodology used. 
2.2. Priming 
Economists have in recent years increasingly adopted priming techniques that are commonly 
used in psychology experiments.5 Priming consists of subtly activating certain mental 
reminders to manipulate subsequent decisions by experimental participants (Bargh and 
Chartrand, 2000). The most common priming methods used by economists include 
questionnaire content manipulation, word unscrambling tasks, paragraph reading, background 
images, norm salience using a confederate, counting tasks, visual or audio cues, or writing a 
paragraph on a given topic. To give a few examples, Cohn et al. (2015) primed financial 
professionals with either a boom or a bust scenario. In treatment ‘Boom’ subjects saw an 
animated, fictive chart of a booming stock market while in the bust condition they saw a chart 
corresponding to the bursting of a bubble. Cohn et al. (2014) primed bankers by using 
questionnaires that made their professional identity salient; the questionnaire method was also 
                                                 
5 For a review on priming in economics, see also Cohn and Maréchal (2016). 
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used in the paper by Cohn et al. (2015) run in Swiss prisons and discussed earlier. Shariff and 
Norenzayan (2007) as well as Benjamin et al. (2016) used a word unscrambling task in order 
to induce a religious prime. Gino et al. (2009) primed participants by making cheating appear 
as a salient social norm. Some studies have found that using subtle cues that make subjects feel 
observed increases pro-sociality (Bateson et al., 2006; Haley and Fessler, 2005; Ekström, 2012), 
while others (such as Fehr and Schneider, 2010) have failed to find an effect.  Andersson et al. 
(2017) used subliminal messages of a pro-social prime and found an increase in donations to 
charity. Vohs et al. (2006) primed subjects with reminders of money, which led them to request 
less help and to be less helpful towards others. Callen et al. (2014) conducted an experiment on 
risk decision in Afghanistan, priming subjects by asking them to recall and recount fearful 
experiences.  
2.3. Ostracism 
We finally mention a few economic experiments that have studied the effect of ostracism in 
social dilemmas. This literature is related to our work because imprisonment can be seen as a 
form of ostracism: criminals are excluded from social life and deprived of their rights and social 
benefits for a certain period of time. This strand of the literature has mainly focused on the 
effect of the threat of exclusion on cooperation and contribution to public good games (Masclet, 
2003; Cinyabuguma et al., 2005; Kerr et al., 2009; Sheremeta et al., 2011; Maier-Rigaud et al., 
2010). Overall, the results provide evidence that the threat of exclusion reduces free-riding 
behavior. Other studies have focused on the type of exclusion, i.e., whether it is irreversible 
(Cinyabuguma, et al., 2005; Maier-Rigaud et al., 2010) or whether subjects are free to move 
immediately to another group (Charness and Yang, 2014).  
More closely related to our work, the lab experiment of Solda and Villeval (2017) 
analyses  the behavior of excluded members, after their reintegration, into a public goods game. 
Subjects are excluded for a determined period of time and not irreversibly. The authors 
manipulate the possible length of exclusion and whether this is determined exogenously or as 
a result of a vote. As in the aforementioned studies, subjects typically exclude the less 
cooperative group members. After reintegration, excluded members increase cooperation rates 
and compliance with the group norm but only when the exclusion is imposed for a short period 
of time, endogenously chosen by vote. Hence, a short duration of exclusion can be 
advantageous in promoting reintegration. This result is particularly interesting for us, since it 
concurs with our finding that a longer time spent in prison is associated with lower pro-sociality 
towards the out-group. 
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3. Experimental design and hypotheses 
Our experimental design is based on three simple games, supplemented by collection of 
sociodemographic data, questions related to inmates’ experience inside the prison and data 
provided by the prison administration.  
3.1. The games 
TG: We use a discrete version of the trust game (Berg et al., 1995). Subjects are matched in 
groups of two and have the role of either player 1 (the sender) or player 2 (the receiver). The 
game is sequential with player 1 as first mover and player 2 as second mover. The sender has 
two strategies, to trust or not to trust player 2. If he decides not to trust, the game ends and both 
players earn 10 euros. If the sender decides to trust, then the game continues and player 2 has 
to decide whether to reciprocate or not. If he decides to reciprocate they both earn 20 euros, 
while if he decides not to reciprocate player 1 earns 5 euros and player 2 earns 35 euros. Given 
this design we are able to classify subjects in the role of player 1 as trusting or not trusting, and 
subjects in the role of player 2 as reciprocal (trustworthy) or not reciprocal (not trustworthy).6 
For self-regarding, money maximizing subjects the subgame perfect equilibrium prediction in 
this game is straightforward. Reciprocating reduces the receiver’s payoff; hence, the receiver 
will never reciprocate. Anticipating this, senders will not trust initially. On the contrary, the 
Pareto efficient solution that provides the highest payoffs is that player 1 trusts and player 2 
reciprocates. 
 In our experiment, subjects were randomly assigned to the sender’s or the receiver’s 
role. We implemented the game in a simultaneous rather than in a sequential form, as follows: 
senders had to indicate whether they trusted the receiver or not, while at the same time receivers 
had to indicate whether they wanted to reciprocate in case the sender had decided to trust them. 
This strategy method ensured that we collected data on the reciprocity of all subjects who were 
assigned to the role of the receiver. 
PD: We use the same version of the simultaneous prisoner’s dilemma as Khadjavi and 
Lange (2013): Two players simultaneously decide either to cooperate with the other player or 
to defect. Assuming selfish own money maximization, the dominant strategy for both players 
                                                 
6 It should be noted that splitting the surplus may be due to several reasons. It can indicate reciprocal behavior or 
a desire to reward trust, but it can also be driven by altruism or inequality aversion on part of the second mover. 
For thorough discussions on other-regarding motivations in the trust game see Cox (2004), Isoni and Sugden 
(2018). We are not able to identify the motivations driving the first- and second mover’s behavior in the trust 
game, not least because we did not elicit participants’ beliefs in the experiment. 
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is to defect and, therefore, the unique Nash equilibrium predicts mutual defection, yielding 
payoffs of 3 euros to both. If both players cooperate the payoffs are 7 euros to each player, 
which Pareto dominates the Nash equilibrium. If the players choose different strategies, the 
defector obtains 9 euros while the cooperator obtains 1 euro. 
EET: The Equality Equivalence Test (Kerschbamer, 2015) elicits distributional 
preference types. Each subject has to make ten binary choices between allocations that both 
involve an own payoff for the decision maker and a payoff for a randomly matched anonymous 
second subject. In each of the ten binary decision problems, one of the two allocations is 
symmetric – i.e., egalitarian, giving the same payoff to each person – while the other leads to 
unequal payoffs for the two subjects. The ten choices are shown in Table 1, which breaks them 
down into a so-called disadvantageous inequality block and an advantageous inequality block, 
depending on whether inequality is to the advantage or disadvantage of the decision maker. In 
both blocks the symmetric payoff and the payoff of the second subject are held constant, while 
the payoff of the decision maker increases in steps of 40 cents. Given this design, in each of the 
two blocks a rational decision maker switches at most once from the symmetric to the 
asymmetric allocation (and never in the other direction).  
Based on the choices in this task each subject reveals information about his or her 
benevolence in the domains of disadvantageous and advantageous inequality. We use a simple 
coding procedure that assigns values from -2.5 to +2.5 (in steps of 0.5) to revealed benevolence 
in each domain, with higher values corresponding to higher benevolence. Benevolence in the 
domain of disadvantageous inequality is thus measured by the so-called ‘x-score’ and 
benevolence in the domain of advantageous inequality by the so-called ‘y-score’.  Based on 
these values, we can also classify each subject into one of four distinct behavioral types.  In 
particular, a decision maker who is benevolent in both domains is classified as an altruist; a 
decision maker who is benevolent when ahead but malevolent when behind is classified as 
inequality averse (IAV); a decision maker who is malevolent in both domains is classified as 
spiteful, and a decision maker who is benevolent when lying behind but malevolent when lying 
ahead is classified as inequality loving.7  
 
                                                 
7 For more details on the precise way in which benevolence and malevolence towards the second subject are 
defined and measured we refer to Kerschbamer (2015). Note that, according to the classification used here, selfish 
subjects are a subset of the four other categories. An alternative classification method would include selfish 
subjects in addition to those classified as strictly altruistic, inequality averse, or inequality loving. Using this 
alternative classification does not change any of our main findings; details are available upon request. 
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Table 1: The Equality Equivalence Test (EET) 
 
Benevolence Behind 
LEFT   RIGHT 
You get Another person 
gets 
  You get Another person 
gets 3.2 5.2 LEFT RIGHT 4 4 
3.6 5.2 LEFT RIGHT 4 4 
4 5.2 LEFT RIGHT 4 4 
4.4 5.2 LEFT RIGHT 4 4 
4.8 5.2 LEFT RIGHT 4 4 
 
Benevolence Ahead 
LEFT   RIGHT 
You get Another person 
gets 
  You get Another person 
gets 3.2 2.8 LEFT RIGHT 4 4 
3.6 2.8 LEFT RIGHT 4 4 
4 2.8 LEFT RIGHT 4 4 
4.4 2.8 LEFT RIGHT 4 4 
4.8 2.8 LEFT RIGHT 4 4 
 
3.2. Identity and in-group out-group effects 
The term identity is used here as an individual’s self-perception regarding his or her main 
characteristic(s) which define(s) them as a person. In general, identity may be driven by a 
person’s individual features (such as a family history8) and exceptional endowments or 
achievements (the tallest man in the world, the best student in class, feeling of supernatural or 
paranormal sensations, etc.), or by a feeling of belonging to a particular group (national, 
religious, linguistic, racial, geographical, consumption of a common brand, etc.). 9  
One manifestation of group identity may be in-group or parochial favoritism, 
understood as the tendency to favor members of one’s own group over those in other groups 
(Everett et al., 2015). In fact, the discrimination comes from two independent but possibly co-
evolving tendencies, namely, cooperation within and competition between groups (Rusch, 
2014). Based on this reasoning, we derive our first testable hypothesis: 
                                                 
8 See, for example, Phelan and Rustichini (2018). 
9 Literally, “that part of an individual’s self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership of a 
social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership” (Tajfel, 
1974, p. 69). 
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H1: Inmates discriminate against the out-of-prison sample. 
This hypothesis relies upon the assumption that a prisoner’s identity is salient among 
the prison sample. As we will show in section 4.2,  this is indeed the case. However, we must 
mention that differences between the inmates’ in- and out-group behavior could also be due to 
things that are unrelated to group membership, such as differences in perceived income or 
deservingness. 
In order to test H1, we let participants in our experiment make their decisions in each 
game under two conditions in a within-subjects design. In the in-group condition, prison 
inmates know that they are matched with another inmate, while in the out-group condition 
inmates know that the partner is someone from outside the prison. Non-institutionalized 
subjects know that in the in-group condition the partner is someone from the same school, while 
in the out-group condition the partner is someone who is in prison. We control for order effects 
by randomizing the order in which participants make their decisions for the in-group and the 
out-group. Asking participants to decide twice and varying the partner’s identity has been used 
by several studies on discrimination (see, e.g. Birkeland et al., 2014; Chen and Li, 2009; 
Romano et al., 2017), and an advantage of this design choice is that it allows us to study our 
research question with the full sample size and without compromising statistical power. 
However, this methodology also faces limitations, and it can be criticized for being prone to 
experimenter demand effects (Zizzo, 2010).10 
3.3. Priming 
In a between-subjects design, inmates are randomly assigned to either the neutral (control) or 
the priming treatment. In the priming treatment, participants are asked to write a piece of text 
on the following topic: “Reflect on your time spent in prison, tell us how it has affected your 
social behavior”. In the neutral treatment, inmates write a paragraph based on the following: 
“Reflect on an activity you like, tell us how it has affected your life”. The procedures are very 
simple: at the beginning of each session and before making their decisions in the subsequent 
                                                 
10 In this respect it is worthwhile noting that administration in both prisons has confirmed to us that the inmates 
have had no previous experience with research studies inside the facility, thus reducing the risk that they are 
familiar with experimental procedures and hypotheses. 
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economic games (TG, PD, EET), subjects receive a sheet with the corresponding text and a 
blank space to write the paragraph.11  
In such a context, group reputation concerns are likely to emerge and affect individual 
behavior, in a similar way in which social dilemmas emerge from the conflict between the 
common and the private interest.  Everett et al. (2015) argue that a person who identifies with 
a group may act in a way resembling a social dilemma, where the public good may be the 
group’s reputation. Interestingly, it has been shown (Hopkins et al., 2007) that, in the name of 
his or her group’s reputation, a subject may choose more cooperative actions towards the out-
group in order to induce out-group members to see in-group members in a more positive way.  
This argument motivates our second testable hypothesis: 
H2: Inmates in the priming treatment display stronger pro-sociality towards the out-of-
prison sample, compared with those in the neutral treatment. 
This hypothesis rests on the assumption that priming increases the salience of the 
prisoner’s identity. In section 4.2 we will present evidence in support of this assumption. 
We have conducted a post-experimental content analysis of the inmates’ accounts in the 
priming treatment, in order to form an impression of the nature of these accounts. In particular, 
we asked two independent research assistants who were blind to our hypotheses to code each 
account as conveying a generally positive, generally negative, or neutral message. The codings 
of the two assistants are very highly correlated (Kendall’s τ = 0.66, p < 0.01; tau-equivalent 
reliability = 0.80) and reveal strong differences between the neutral and primed group. 12 While 
the large majority of accounts (35 of 47, or 74.5%) in the neutral group were coded as neutral 
in terms of content, neutral accounts represent only 25.9% of the total (14 of 54) in the primed 
group. This difference is statistically significant (χ2 = 23.71, p < 0.01, N = 101) and supports 
the validity of our priming tool, by showing that we have indeed succeeded in creating a neutral 
group against which the effect of the priming instrument can be evaluated. 
To summarize, subjects have to decide sequentially in six games: TG in-group, TG out-
group, PD in-group, PD out-group, EET in-group, and EET out-group.  Therefore, we conduct 
three economic games in a 2 x 2 factorial design combining the in-group vs. out-group 
                                                 
11 We implement the priming manipulation only with the sample of prison inmates, given that the priming 
condition requires participants to reflect on and give an account of their time spent in prison: this would not be a 
reasonable task for students who have never been imprisoned. 
12 The content analysis has been conducted for 101 out of 105 inmates’ accounts, since four accounts were illegible. 
In all cases of disagreement (N=24), the two coders had to meet and decide on a common coding. 
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manipulation (within-subjects) and the neutral vs. priming manipulation (between-subjects). 
Note that we randomly assigned participants as either player 1 (trustor) or player 2 (trustee) in 
the TG, hence we have 59 inmates in the role of player 1 and 46 as player 2. 
3.4. Questionnaires 
After making their decisions in the TG, PD and EET, inmates were asked to fill out a 
questionnaire about their nationality, age, marital status, education level, and number of siblings 
(see Appendix B). Additionally, we asked them to answer questions regarding the conditions 
of their imprisonment: time spent in the current prison, number of times imprisoned, total time 
spent in prison during their life, type and length of sentence, attendance of religious activities 
in prison, number of cell mates, frequency of leaving the prison (for any reason) and number 
of working days per month. The prison administration provided us with this same information, 
allowing us to double check and correct for minor discrepancies. 
3.5. Procedures with institutionalized subjects 
All sessions were run in two male prisons in Chania, Greece. In November 2016 we ran one 
session in the high security prison facility “Crete 1” and two simultaneous sessions in the low 
security agricultural prison facility of “Agia”. In April 2017 we conducted an additional session 
in the low security prison. We recruited a total of 105 volunteer male inmates by posting 
announcements in several languages (Greek, English, Arabic and French), around the prison 
premises to invite inmates to participate in the experiment. Additionally, two days before each 
session, the experimenters went to the prison to answer possible questions and give a short 
explanation of what is an economic experiment. Once they decided to participate, inmates had 
to register through the prison administration. 
In the high security prison, the single session was conducted in the library (N=14). In 
the low security prison, the two simultaneous sessions were run in the library and in the gym 
(N=31 and N=12, respectively), and the last session was run only in the library (N=48). No 
guards were present during the sessions and we insisted on and guaranteed subjects about 
anonymity, by giving them a random number so there was no way to associate a decision with 
a name. 13 We were very cautious in minimizing any kind of audience effects.  
                                                 
13 The administration was in charge of creating a double blind process between the experimentalists and the 
inmates. The reason to have this blind process was not only to ensure anonymity in the experimental procedure, 
but also to comply with the regulations of the penitentiary center. Each participant was given a random number, 
which was written in his booklet set. Once the inmate finished filling out the booklet and before leaving the 
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The experiment was conducted with pencil and paper. Subjects could choose among 
four different languages for their booklet of instructions: Greek, English, Arabic or French.14 
We enforced the usual experimental practice of not allowing for communication among 
subjects and ensuring anonymity in decision making. For that purpose, we had subjects seat in 
big tables of four with sufficient distance from each other, and we tried to seat them in mixed 
groups of different nationalities and languages of instructions to make communication and 
copying even less likely.  
Once the session was ready to start, one of the experimenters explained aloud the 
general instructions of the experiment and answered possible questions. We stressed that the 
experiment was incentive compatible, meaning that participants would be paid with real money 
based on their decisions. Subjects were told that one game would be chosen randomly by the 
social worker at the end of the session. All the participants were invited to assist to the random 
draw of the game as witnesses. Given that inmates are not allowed to receive money directly, 
we explained to them that their payment would be credited to their personal prison account, 
which can be used to buy goods inside the prison (e.g., in the cafeteria). 
Afterwards, the experiment started and participants were asked to keep silent until the 
end of the session. We randomized the order in which the PD and TG were presented and 
played, although we kept the EET always as the third game. The instructions for each game 
were read in silent by each subject and they could go through the booklet at their own pace. 
Before proceeding to the three games, all participants had to complete the priming task by 
writing the corresponding piece of text. Three experimenters were present in each session in 
order to answer any question in private and to assist participants. Whenever participants had 
finished filling out their booklet of instructions (including the priming text, the three games, 
and the questionnaires), they were allowed to leave the session.15 We executed the payments 
                                                 
laboratory, he announced his random number to the administration, who recorded the number and associated it to 
the corresponding person. Afterwards, the administration provided us with additional data associated to each 
number. In this way we were only able to match a random number to the administrative data and experimental 
choices. Moreover, we did not provide information on inmates' experimental choices to the administration, to 
ensure anonymity between inmates and administration in this dimension and to respect inmates' privacy. This 
procedure was clearly explained to inmates, to ensure that their decisions were made free of any concerns about 
lack of privacy or anonymity. 
14 Instructions in languages other than English were translated from English by native speakers. In Table A1 
(Appendix A) we show how many inmates chose to receive the instructions in each language. That table also 
shows the distribution of languages in which inmates completed the priming task. Six subjects chose to complete 
the task in a language other than Greek, English, Arabic and French. We note that our research team made sure 
that every participant understood the instructions, and to the best of our knowledge there were no cases where 
language posed a threat on understanding. Sample instructions can be found in Appendix B. 
15 We note that all participants completed all parts of the experiment  and none left a session before doing so. 
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one day later, after randomly matching the decisions of the participants and calculating the 
resulting payoffs.  
3.6. Procedures with non-institutionalized subjects 
The non-institutionalized subjects were recruited in the Mediterranean Agronomic Institute of 
Chania (MAICH) also located in Chania, Greece. This is a boarding school in which students 
spend most of their time in a closed environment, hence they attend lectures, eat and sleep in 
the school, and typically share rooms with other students. We ran one session with 40 volunteer 
students from different degrees in November 2016. The procedures were as similar as possible 
to the ones followed in prison. Each subject had a booklet (in English, since this is the language 
of instruction at the school) with a different order between PD and TG and with different orders 
for the in-group and the out-group decision. Each subject was assigned a random number to 
ensure anonymity.  One of the experimenters explained aloud the general instructions and 
answered possible questions. Afterwards, all subjects went alone through the different games 
and questionnaires.  Similarly, subjects were aware that only one game would be randomly 
chosen at the end of the session to determine their earnings.16 It is important to acknowledge 
that the sample of non-institutionalized participants differs to prison inmates along several 
dimensions, such as gender and age composition, educational background and socioeconomic 
background. The main purpose of collecting data from this sample is thus not to make direct 
comparisons between the behavior of the two samples, but rather to create an out-group that is 
used for matching purposes in the experiment. Nevertheless, for completeness, in Appendix A 
we show how the behavior of our focus group of inmates compares to that of students. 
4. Results 
We present our results in three subsections. We first describe our sample. Second, we show a 
landscape of subjects’ social behavior and study in-group-out-group bias among inmates by 
documenting the differences in their social behavior when they are matched with another inmate 
versus with someone from outside prison. Third, we demonstrate the effect of the priming 
intervention on inmates’ social behavior.  
                                                 
16 Given that the number of subjects was higher in the prison than in the student sample, we matched each student 
to two or three prisoners in order to calculate payoffs. However, for each student we only paid out one of the 
matchings. 
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4.1. The sample 
In the following analysis we pool the data from the low and the high security prisons, given that 
no significant differences in decisions were found between the two samples in any of the three 
experimental games. Our sample is composed of 145 subjects in total, 105 of whom are male 
inmates and 40 (25 female and 15 male) are subjects from the student group. Among the 105 
inmates, 57 participated in the priming treatment and 48 in the neutral treatment. 59 inmates 
were randomly assigned to the role of player 1 and 46 the role of player 2 in the trust game.  
  Table 2 shows some descriptive statistics for the sample of prison inmates. In the upper 
panel of the table we provide information on the type of crime committed, classifying crimes 
into eight categories as recorded – and provided to us – by the prison administration: Drug 
related offences, robbery, smuggling goods, human trafficking, homicide, sexual crime, 
economic crime, firearms violations. Note that some inmates have been sentenced for two or 
more crimes. The variable Penalty (also provided by prison authorities) captures the total 
sentence in years. We also collected some information regarding inmates’ living conditions in 
prison, including: Frequency of getting out of the facility (measured in days per month), number 
of people they share a cell with, number of days per month that they work inside the facility, 
and average number of visits per month. Finally, the lower panel of the table provides 
information about sociodemographic variables including mean age, marital status, number of 
children, number of siblings, and the level of education (coded as 0: none; 1: elementary 2: 
secondary school; 3: high school; 4: university; 5: master). The table breaks down all variables 
between the neutral and priming group, and shows that our sample is quite balanced among the 
two treatments, albeit with a number of exceptions. In the regression analysis of section 5 we 
therefore control for a number of potentially relevant variables. 
Table 2:  Descriptive statistics for the sample of inmates 
 FULL SAMPLE 
NEUTRAL 
TREATMENT 
PRIMING           
TREATMENT 
 
Variable N 
Rel. 
freq. 
Std. 
dev. 
N 
Rel. 
freq. 
Std. 
dev. 
N 
Rel. 
freq. 
Std. 
dev. 
p- 
value 
Type of 
sentence 
          
Drug related 43 0.41 0.49 19 0.40 0.49 24 0.42 0.50 0.79 
Robbery 36 0.34 0.48 18 0.37 0.49 18 0.32 0.47 0.52 
Smuggling 
goods 
6 0.06 0.23 3 0.06 0.24 3 0.05 0.22 0.83 
Human 
trafficking 
13 0.12 0.33 5 0.10 0.31 8 0.14 0.35 0.57 
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Homicide 7 0.06 0.25 2 0.04 0.20 5 0.09 0.28 0.35 
Sexual crime 3 0.03 0.17 1 0.02 0.14 2 0.03 0.19 0.66 
Economic 
crime 
8 0.08 0.27 3 0.06 0.24 5 0.09 0.28 0.63 
Firearms 
violations 
7 0.06 0.25 4 0.08 0.28 3 0.05 0.22 0.53 
           
Variable N Mean 
Std. 
dev. 
N Mean 
Std. 
dev. 
N Mean 
Std. 
dev. 
p- 
value 
Sentence and prison conditions 
Penalty 101 14.81 18.2
2 
45 11.20 14.17 56 18.18 21.5
8 
0.09 
Time served 105 3.87 4.79 48 3.55 4.58 57 4.15 4.98 0.29 
Frequency out 105 4.07 32.3
9 
48 7.60 47.63 57 1.08 4.96 0.72 
Cell shared 103 1.60 1.59 47 1.74 1.49 56 1.43 1.52 0.29 
Work days 105 95.89 171.
4 
48 95.46 145.6 57 96.26 191.
7 
0.69 
Visits 91 0.27 0.45 44 0.27 0.45 47 0.28 0.45 0.97 
Sociodemographic variables 
Age 105 35.95 9.40 48 33.65 8.60 57 38.00 9.68 0.02 
Married 104 0.37 0.48 48 0.25 0.44 56 0.46 0.50 0.02 
Siblings 104 4.83 4.15 47 4.57 2.88 57 5.04 4.98 0.58 
Education 101 2.00 0.92 48 2.00 0.95 53 2.00 0.90 0.88 
The upper panel reports relative frequencies of each type of crime in the subject pool. Note that 
frequencies do not add up to 1 because some of the participants have two or more sentences. The lower 
panel reports means of selected variables. The p-values correspond to t-tests for continuous variables, 
and chi-squared tests for binary variables and Education, comparing Neutral with Priming treatment. 
 
4.2. In-group-out-group bias: Inmates’ parochialism and discrimination 
In this section we test hypothesis H1, by providing a description of inmates’ behavior in the 
three experimental games and searching for parochialism and discrimination by comparing  
behavior towards the in-group (other inmates) and towards the out-group (people from outside 
prison). Figure 1 shows trust and reciprocity rates in the TG. The levels of trust are very similar: 
44.07% of inmates trust the in-group versus 40.68% who trust the out-group (McNemar χ2 =
0.02, p = 0.89, N = 118). On the other hand, we observe a large difference in terms of 
reciprocity, i.e., trustworthiness by second movers: 65.22% of them are reciprocal towards the 
in-group and split the available surplus, versus 30.43% who share with the out-group. This 
difference is significant (McNemar χ2 = 5.11, p = 0.02, N = 92) and indicates discrimination 
against the out-group. 
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Figure 1: Inmates’ decisions in the TG, broken down by behavior towards the in-group and 
out-group. Trust is measured as percentage of first movers who choose to trust in the TG; 
reciprocity is measured as percentage of second movers who choose to reciprocate in the TG. 
Bars include 95% confidence intervals. 
 
Furthermore, we observe discrimination against the out-group in terms of cooperation. 
As shown in Figure 2, 55.24% of inmates cooperate with other inmates, and only 31.43% 
cooperate with people from outside prison. The difference is statistically significant (McNemar 
χ2 = 6.33, p = 0.01, N = 210). 
 
Figure 2: Inmates’ decisions in the PD, broken down by behavior towards the in-group and 
out-group. Bars show cooperation rates and include 95% confidence intervals. 
 
Figure 3 plots the distributional preference types among prisoners based on their 
decisions in the EET, again differentiating between decisions made to the in-group and to the 
44,07
40,68
65,22
30,43
0
20
40
60
80
100
%
TRUST GAME
In-group Out-group
TRUST RECIPROCITY
55,24
31,43
0
20
40
60
80
100
% PRISONER'S DILEMMA
In-group Out-group
COOPERATION 
20 
 
out-group. Overall, we do not find any significant differences in this regards. 20% and 19.05% 
of inmates are spiteful when interacting with another inmate and with someone from outside 
the prison, respectively (McNemar χ2 = 0.001, p = 1.00, N = 210). 13.33% and 15.25% are 
altruistic with the in-group and out-group, respectively (McNemar χ2 = 0.03, p = 0.85, N =
210). Around one third are inequality averse when interacting with both groups (McNemar 
χ2 = 0.001, p = 1.00, N = 210). Similarly, around one third are inequality loving when they 
are matched with another inmate and with someone from outside the prison as well (McNemar 
χ2 = 0.01, p = 0.90, N = 210).  
 
 
 
Figure 3: Inmates’ classification of types (Spiteful, Altruistic, Inequality Averse, Inequality 
Loving) in the EET, broken down by behavior towards the in-group and out-group. Bars show 
the percentage of subjects classified into each type and include 95% confidence intervals. 
 
The very high prevalence of inequality loving types, accounting for 31.43% of the total, 
is a striking feature of the distribution of types. This rate is more than six times higher than 
among students (see Appendix A for details), and it is particularly noteworthy since previous 
studies that use the EET report very low frequencies of this behavioral type (Balafoutas et al., 
2012; Balafoutas et al., 2014; Kerschbamer et al., 2017). A possible explanation for this result 
might be related to the hierarchical systems that commonly exist in prisons, meaning that 
inmates are used to being either in the role of the kiss-up or in the role of the boss, thereby 
increasing benevolence towards subjects lying ahead and decreasing benevolence towards those 
who are behind.  However, since we cannot present evidence other than casual observation 
during the sessions to substantiate this claim, we restrict ourselves to simply documenting this 
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interesting finding on the exceptionally high proportion of inequality loving types among 
prisoners.17 
The aforementioned results partly support H1 and present novel evidence of 
discrimination from inmates in favor of their in-group and against their out-group, expressed 
by means of lower reciprocity and cooperation rates. On the other hand, we find no significant 
differences in trust rates or in the EET. This latter result is in line with Birkeland et al. (2014) 
who also find no evidence of in-group bias in the behavior of prisoners in a non-strategic context 
such as that of the dictator game (or the EET in our experiment). 
Result 1: Inmates exhibit significantly less reciprocity and are less cooperative towards 
the out-group (i.e., people from outside the prison) than towards other inmates. 
Hypothesis H1 rests on the assumption that prison inmates indeed perceive other 
inmates as an in-group, with which they feel identified. Moreover, H2 was motivated by means 
of stronger concerns for group reputation among primed inmates, which in turn suggests that 
group identification should be stronger in the primed group. In order to support these 
assumptions we present here evidence from a post-experimental questionnaire, which we 
conducted only in the second set of sessions in April 2017 (N=48). In this questionnaire we 
asked inmates to indicate the extent to which they feel identified with each of three possible 
groups, including the ethnic and religious group and the group of prisoners. As shown in Table 
3, identification was strongest with the prisoner group, followed closely by the ethnic group. 
Identifications with both groups were significantly stronger than with the religious group. These 
results confirm that being a prisoner is indeed a salient identity and our subjects perceive other 
inmates as their in-group. The lower panel of the table compares identifications across priming 
conditions: in line with the reasoning behind H2, the prisoner identity increases in strength 
among the primed inmates who are asked to reflect on their time spent in prison, while the other 
two identities do not differ significantly by treatment. 
 
                                                 
17 A further potential explanation could be related to poor comprehension of the EET by inmates. In this respect, 
we first note that we took enough time to answer questions in private, and ensure understanding of all experimental 
games during the sessions to the extent possible. Moreover, we use the inmates’ level of education as a proxy for 
cognitive ability and perform a median split, comparing the distribution of types among inmates with above and 
below median educational attainment, failing to find significant differences between the two distributions. We also 
compute the correlation coefficients between education level and x- and y-scores and find that they are close to 
zero and insignificant (ρ=-0.08, p=0.16; ρ=0.07, p=0.22, for x-scores and y-scores, respectively). 
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Table 3: Survey evidence on inmates’ identification with various groups 
 N Mean St. Dev. 
Ethnical vs. 
Religious 
Ethnical vs. 
Prisoners 
Religious vs. 
Prisoners 
Ethnical Group 48 3.45 1.64    
Religious Group 48 2.63 1.39    
Prisoner Group 48 3.56 1.59 
z = 3.01 
p < 0.01*** 
z = -0.49 
p = 0.62 
z =  -2.60 
p < 0.01*** 
 
 Neutral Treatment Priming Treatment Ranksum M-W test 
Ethnical Group 3.62 3.29 z = 0.82, p = 0.41 
Religious Group 2.79 2.46 z = 0.55, p = 0.58 
Prisoner Group 2.96 4.17 z = -2.59, p < 0.01*** 
Coding: 1= I do not feel identified with this group, 5= I definitely feel identified with this 
group 
Regarding possible discriminatory behavior among the group of students, we find no 
evidence of discrimination in any of the dimensions in the experiment: students are equally 
trusting, reciprocal, cooperative, and benevolent towards their in-group of other students than 
towards their out-group of prison inmates, in the sense that we document no significant 
differences in any of these dimensions. Given that the focus of our work is on the behavior of 
inmates, we relegate to Appendix A the presentation of student behavior broken down by 
partner group (see Figures A4 to A6). 
4.3. Effects of the priming intervention 
We begin the analysis of how priming affects inmates’ social behavior by comparing choices 
between the group of prisoners who were subjected to our priming intervention and those who 
participated in the neutral treatment. The analysis is shown in Figure 4 and reveals a strong 
increase on inmates’ trust and reciprocity towards the out-group as a result of the priming 
intervention. Although priming has no significant effect on trust towards members of the in-
group (χ2 = 0.22, p = 0.66, N = 59), it almost triples the percentage of inmates who trust 
members of the out-group (59.4% vs. 18.5%; χ2 = 10.13, p < 0.01, N = 59). Similarly, 
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priming does not affect the levels of reciprocity towards the in-group (χ2 = 0.66, p =
0.42, N = 46), but it increases the level of reciprocity towards the out-group by a factor of more 
than three (44% 𝑣𝑠. 14.3%; χ2 = 4.76, p = 0.03, N =46). 
 
Figure 4: Inmates’ decisions in the TG, neutral vs. priming treatment. ‘Trust In-Group’ and 
‘Trust Out-Group’ denote trusting rates towards a partner from the in-group and out-group, 
respectively. ‘Recipr. In-group’ and Recipr. Out-group’ define reciprocity rates in an analogous 
way. Bars include 95% confidence intervals. 
 
This pattern is also present in the prisoner’s dilemma. Figure 5 shows a non-significant 
effect of priming on cooperation towards the in-group (χ2 = 1.89, p = 0.17, N = 105), but a 
strong increase of cooperation towards the out-group (38.6% 𝑣𝑠. 22.9%; χ2 = 2.98, p =
0.08, N = 105). Hence, hypothesis H2 is confirmed for the dimensions of trust, reciprocity, 
and cooperation. 
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Figure 5:  Inmates’ decisions in the PD, neutral vs. priming treatment. ‘Cooperation In-
group’ and ‘Cooperation Out-group’ denote cooperation rates with a partner from the in-
group and out-group, respectively. 
 
On the contrary, the priming intervention seems to have no effect on distributional 
choices in the non-strategic context of the EET. Figure 6 displays the distribution of types by 
comparing the subjects in the neutral and in the priming treatment. All comparisons are 
insignificant, with the partial exception of a lower fraction of inequality loving types towards 
the in-group (41.7% 𝑣𝑠. 24.6%; χ2 = 3.48, p = 0.06, N = 105).18 
 
                                                 
18 χ2 tests also confirm that the distributions of types do not differ significantly by priming condition, for choices 
towards the in-group or the out-group (p=0.23, p=0.88, respectively). 
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Figure 6: Inmates’ classification of types in the EET (Spiteful, Altruistic, Inequality Averse, 
Inequality Loving), neutral vs. priming treatment. Bars show percentage of subjects classified 
into each type and include 95% confidence intervals. 
Result 2: The priming intervention increases the pro-social behavior of inmates towards 
the out-group by leading to higher levels of trust, reciprocity and cooperation. On the contrary, 
the intervention does not significantly alter the distribution of types in the EET and it has no 
effect on behavior towards the in-group. 
 In the priming task inmates were asked to reflect about their time in prison and to think 
about their social behavior. Thus, the priming manipulation may have activated different 
concepts. One way to address this issue is to analyze the content of inmates’ accounts in the 
priming task in order to identify the concepts activated by priming. For this purpose, we 
employed two independent research assistants and asked them to read all accounts in the 
priming treatment and to indicate for each account whether it refers to time spent in prison, 
social behavior, or none of the these concepts. Each assistant, independently, coded all 
accounts. The two codings are very highly correlated (Spearman’s ρ=0.82, p<0.01, N=57), 
leading to a scale reliability coefficient (Crohnbach’s alpha) of 0.89. The two assistants met 
and jointly decided on a common coding in all cases of disagreement. Based on this method, 
we classified all accounts into one of the following categories: (i) accounts referring to time 
spent in prison, (ii) accounts referring to social behavior, (iii) accounts referring to none of the 
previous two concepts.19  
                                                 
19 A fourth possible category would include accounts referring to both, time spent in prison and social behavior. 
Given that this category cannot be useful in disentangling the effects of the two types of accounts, we asked our 
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Of 57 scripts, the majority (33 scripts, or 58%) were coded as primarily related to time 
spent in prison, 13 (23%) were coded as primarily related to social behavior, and 11 (19%) as 
related to none of the two. This already suggests that time in prison was the most prominent 
concept activated by priming. Moreover, in order to give an impression of how the priming 
effects are related to script content, in Table 4 we present behavior in the three experimental 
games, disaggregated by category of coded script.  
 
Table 4. Choices in the experimental games, by coded category of inmates’ account 
 
 Coded category of inmates’ accounts 
  Time in prison Social behavior None 
Trust Game:    
Trust in-group 36.4 60.0 80.0 
Trust out-group 72.7 60.0 0.0 
Reciprocity in-group 50.0 72.7 50.0 
Reciprocity out-group 87.5 36.4 0.0 
Prisoner’s Dilemma:    
Cooperation in-group 46.7 50.0 54.5 
Cooperation outgroup 63.3 18.8 0.0 
Equality Equivalence Test:    
Spiteful in-group 16.7 25.0 27.3 
Spiteful out-group 16.7 18.8 18.2 
Inequality averse in-group 36.7 31.3 45.5 
Inequality averse out-group 46.7 31.3 27.3 
Altruistic in-group 16.7 18.8 18.2 
Altruistic out-group 13.3 6.3 27.3 
Inequality loving in-group 30.0 25.0 9.1 
Inequality loving out-group 23.3 43.8 27.3 
Notes: All values represent percentages. Trust measures the % of first movers who trust in the 
TG; Reciprocity measures the % of second movers who reciprocate in the TG; Cooperation 
measures the % of subjects who cooperate in the PD; Spiteful, Inequality averse, Altruistic, 
Inequality loving measure the % of subjects classified in each of the four categories in the EET. 
N=33, N=13, N=11 for the categories ‘Time in prison’, ‘Social behavior’, ‘None’, respectively.  
 
 
                                                 
assistants to decide which of the two concepts featured more prominently in the respective account for all such 
cases. 
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Table 4 suggests that the main finding with respect to the effect of priming – the increase 
in pro-sociality towards the out-group – is driven by those inmates who wrote about time spent 
in prison in their scripts. In the dimension of trust, those inmates trust the out-group 72.7% of 
the time, compared to only 36.4% who trust the in-group. The pattern is very similar in the 
dimension of reciprocity (87.5% are reciprocal towards the out-group compared with 50% 
towards the in-group) and cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma (63.3% cooperate with the 
out-group and 46.7% with the in-group). All these differences are reversed among those inmates 
who wrote about social behavior in their scripts, and also among those who wrote about neither 
time spent in prison nor social behavior (noting, however, that all numbers in these two 
categories are based on very few observations and should thus be interpreted with caution). 
Finally, consistent with the absence of treatment differences in EET classification between the 
primed and neutral group (see Figure 6), we find that the proportions of the four distributional 
preference types are typically quite similar across coded categories. Again, these figures are 
based on very few observations per distributional preference type and are therefore likely to be 
imprecise. 
It is evident from the numbers shown in Table 4 that scripts referring to time spent in 
prison lead to very high levels of pro-sociality towards the out-group in the dimensions of trust, 
reciprocity and cooperation, helping us to better understand how the priming intervention 
worked. This analysis also hints towards the possibility that our findings actually represent a 
lower bound of the effects that an intervention would have if it only asked inmates to think 
about their time in prison.  
5. Econometric analysis of inmates’ decisions 
In this section we use multivariate regression models in order to offer a richer and more nuanced 
analysis of the outcomes of interest. The dependent variables in Table 5 are trusting rates from 
the TG (columns 1-2), reciprocity rates from the TG (columns 3-4), cooperation rates in the PD 
(columns 5-6), as well as benevolence in the domain of advantageous and disadvantageous 
inequality (columns 7-10). All specifications show estimates from linear probability models. 
However, in Appendix A (Table A2) we also estimate Probit models (in columns 1-6) and 
ordered Probit models (for columns 7-10) and confirm that our results remain qualitatively 
unchanged. Given that each inmate made two decisions in each game (one for the in-group and 
one for the out-group), all specifications include individual random effects. For each dependent 
variable, we estimate one parsimonious specification aimed at confirming Results 1 and 2 by 
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means of the right-hand side dummy variables Out-group (equal to 1 if the matched partner is 
not a prisoner) and Priming (equal to 1 if the inmate belongs to the group that underwent the 
priming intervention), as well as an interaction term between the two. We also present a full 
specification that includes a number of potentially relevant control variables. 
Among these variables, of particular interest for our research questions is Time Served, 
which is provided by the prison administration and measures (in years) the time spent by an 
inmate at the current prison.20 The coefficient of this variable provides an estimate of the effect 
of time spent in prison on social behavior, and can thus be interpreted as an estimate of a 
rehabilitation effect. In order to account for the fact that a longer time served, as well as 
behavior in our experimental games are simultaneously determined by a lower pro-social 
inclination, we include in all regressions the variable Penalty, which measures the total sentence 
and, therefore, controls for the possibility that more antisocial prisoners have been longer in 
prison simply due to a longer initial sentence. To further account for unobservable 
characteristics related to pro-social inclination, we include dummy variables for the various 
kinds of crimes committed by the inmates (as defined in section 4.1). Robbery is the omitted 
category in the regressions.21 Further control variables include the number of inmates with 
whom the cell is shared, as well as the inmate’s age and marital status. All standard errors are 
clustered at the session level.  
The first thing to note in the regressions is that Result 1 is fully confirmed for all games, 
both in the parsimonious and in the full specifications. In particular, the negative and highly 
significant coefficients for Out-group in the reciprocity and cooperation regressions confirm 
the presence of discrimination against the sample of non-prisoners. The magnitude of the effect 
of discrimination is striking: depending on specification, non-primed inmates are between 48% 
and 57% less likely to reciprocate towards a member of the out-group than towards another 
inmate, and they are between 24% and 40% less likely to cooperate with the out-group. There 
is also some weak evidence that inmates are less trusting towards the out-group, but this effect 
vanishes once the full set of controls is included. 
                                                 
20 For most prisoners we also have data on the total time spent in prison over their lifetime. However, we do not 
use these data for our analysis since, contrary to time served in the current prison, they are self-reported and prison 
administration has indicated that there is no reliable way of confirming the accuracy of these data. 
21 To have an ordering of the various offences with respect to their severity, we ran simple linear regressions of 
the total penalty on each category independently. The offences are ordered as follows (in ascending order of 
severity): Robbery, smuggling goods, sexual crime, economic crime, firearms violations, drug related offences, 
human trafficking, homicide. Hence, the omitted category of robbery is the least severe offence. These results 
remain practically unchanged if we run a multivariate regression with all crime type dummies included 
simultaneously. 
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Turning to the effect of priming (Result 2), again the regression estimates are fully in 
line with the non-parametric analysis of section 4.3. Priming has an insignificant coefficient in 
columns 1-6, indicating that the priming intervention does not affect inmates’ behavior towards 
other inmates with respect to trust, reciprocity, and cooperation. On the contrary, the coefficient 
of the interaction term Out-group*Priming is always positive and significant for these 
dimensions, confirming that priming affects behavior towards the out-group in a qualitatively 
different way than towards the in-group. The joint coefficients (Priming + Out-group* 
Priming), shown at the bottom of Table 5, capture the effect of the intervention on behavior 
towards the out-group, and these coefficients are positive, of large magnitude (ranging between 
15% for cooperation rates and about 30%-40% for trust and reciprocity rates) and significant 
in five of six specifications for these three dimensions. Another way of looking at the effect of 
priming on discrimination is by means of the joint coefficients (Out-group + Out-
group*Priming), which are smaller and generally insignificant, revealing that no systematic 
discrimination can be detected among primed inmates. A single exception is the positive joint 
coefficient in column (2), which suggests that some reverse discrimination may be present, in 
the form of higher trust rates towards the out-group. 
With respect to distributional preferences, our regressions can provide some additional 
information compared to the non-parametric analysis of section 4.3. This is due to the fact that 
in Table 5 the dependent variable is not the individual type, but the strength of benevolence (or 
malevolence) towards another individual as measured by the x-score (columns 7-8) and the y-
score (columns 9-10). This allows us to always use the full sample (pooling all types together) 
and it also allows documenting and exploiting changes in revealed benevolence that are not 
large enough to result in changes in type. The regression results suggest that priming affects the 
pro-sociality of inmates towards their in-group in two different directions: negatively in the 
domain of disadvantageous inequality (x-scores) and positively in the domain of advantageous 
inequality (y-scores). Casual inspection of the type classification in Figure 6 is in line with these 
effects, since both can explain the lower prevalence of inequality loving types when primed 
inmates play the EET with an in-group member. However, while quite sizeable, the coefficients 
are insignificant (with the partial exception of column 10). Given the absence of discrimination 
in the neutral group (see the coefficients for Out-group in columns 7-10) and the insignificant 
impact of priming on inmates’ behavior, it is no surprise that we also fail to find any 
discrimination against the out-group among primed inmates (joint coefficients Out-group+ 
Out-group* Priming). 
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 In addition to providing further support for our main results, the regressions of Table 5 
allow us to estimate in the five full specifications the effect of spending time in prison 
(controlling for the total sentence), as measured by the variable Time Served. The coefficient of 
this variable is generally insignificant with the exception of specification (10), suggesting that 
a longer time spent in prison reduces benevolence when lying ahead of another participant but 
does not affect behavior in the other domains. However, this coefficient captures the effect of 
time served on behavior towards the in-group: the picture changes if we examine the joint 
coefficient (Time Served + Out-group*Time Served), which is again significantly negative in 
the y-score regression of column (10), but in addition has a significant negative coefficient in 
the trust regression in (2) as well as in the cooperation regression in (4).22 Taken together, these 
findings suggest that a longer time spent in prison generally reduces pro-social behavior 
towards the out-group. From a policy perspective this is quite worrying, since it suggests that 
pro-social motivation among inmates seems to wane over time, possibly rendering their re-
integration after release particularly problematic. Our priming intervention is offering a way to 
counter-balance this negative effect of time spent in prison, given that it has already been shown 
to increase pro-sociality, especially towards the out-group. 
Result 3: A longer time spent in prison is associated with lower trust and cooperation 
rates towards the out-group, as well as decreased benevolence towards both groups when lying 
ahead of another participant.  
 While the independent variables Out-group and Priming that have been used to analyze 
discrimination and the effects of priming are by design exogenous as part of the experiment, a 
potential concern with Time Served is that it may suffer from a simultaneity bias that would 
impede causal inference on how time spent in prison affects pro-social behavior in the Table 5 
regressions. Hence, although the regressions include a number of variables to account for this 
possibility, causality cannot be established with certainty and these results must be interpreted 
with caution. As an additional step in this respect, we have also estimated two-stage least 
squares versions of the five full specifications. In those regressions we use the following two 
instruments for Time Served: the frequency of leaving prison (measured in days per month) and 
the number of days per month doing some work in the facility. Both variables are likely to 
                                                 
22 We have also estimated versions of all regressions that include an interaction term between time served and 
priming, as well as the three-way interaction term Out-group*Priming*Time Served. The interaction between time 
served and priming is always insignificant with one exception (the cooperation regression), while the three-way 
interaction term is always insignificant and small in magnitude. The results are available from the authors upon 
request. 
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correlate with the time spent in prison (for instance, because they depend on the total sentence 
received or because certain privileges are only awarded after completing part of the sentence), 
while they are unlikely determinants of behavior in our experimental games.23 In terms of 
instrument strength, we note that working days per month – but not the frequency of leaving 
prison – is a significant predictor of time served in all first stage regressions, and that testing 
for instrument strength based on first stage F statistics (following Stock and Yogo, 2005) rejects 
the null hypothesis of weak instruments in all but one (the reciprocity) specification. 
Our main results remain robust to instrumental variables estimation, painting a 
consistent picture with respect to the negative effects of time spent in prison on pro-social 
behavior, primarily towards the out-group: the significant negative effects of Time Served 
persist for the y-score (both towards the in-group and the out-group), as well as in the 
dimensions of trust and cooperation towards the out-group. However, we relegate this analysis 
to Table A3 in Appendix A, due to the fact that Wu-Hausman tests of endogeneity fail to reject 
the null hypothesis that Time Served can be treated as exogenous, albeit with one exception in 
the regression on y-scores (see bottom of Table A3 for details on tests of endogeneity and of 
over-identifying restrictions). 
In terms of further control variables (Penalty, High Security, Number of Cell Mates, 
Age, socioeconomic controls and the crime categories), we note that out of 75 estimated 
coefficients for these variables in columns (2), (4), (6), (8) and (10) of Table 5, only 16 are 
significant at least at the 10% level, and only the variable Smuggling Goods is significant in 
more than two specifications. For instance, the most severe crime of homicide is associated 
with significantly lower reciprocity levels but has positive and insignificant coefficients in all 
other specifications. Overall, it is hard to discern any systematic pattern regarding the pro-
sociality attributed to different types of committed crimes. Inmates from the high security 
prison are, ceteris paribus, less reciprocal, but there are no significant differences between the 
two prisons in any other dimension – which may, however, also be due to the small sample in 
the high security prison.  
                                                 
23 We must, however, acknowledge that this analysis must be interpreted with caution since instrument exogeneity 
cannot be tested. Sargan’s tests of overidentifying restrictions, reported in Table A3, do not reject the null 
hypothesis that all instruments are exogenous, under the assumption that at least one of them is exogenous. 
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Table 5: Econometric analysis 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 Trust Trust Recipr. Recipr. Cooper. Cooper. x-score x-score y-score y-score 
Out-group -0.222* -0.112 -0.571*** -0.483*** -0.396*** -0.238** -0.208 0.021 0.208 0.006 
 (0.125) (0.163) (0.134) (0.163) (0.093) (0.114) (0.345) (0.439) (0.328) (0.406) 
Priming 0.061 -0.031 -0.114 -0.050 -0.134 -0.153 -0.485 -0.533 0.612 0.899* 
 (0.125) (0.142) (0.138) (0.158) (0.094) (0.103) (0.419) (0.471) (0.447) (0.471) 
Out-group*Priming 0.347** 0.380** 0.411** 0.343* 0.291** 0.305** 0.542 0.410 -0.226 -0.187 
 (0.170) (0.183) (0.181) (0.201) (0.126) (0.133) (0.468) (0.512) (0.446) (0.474) 
Time Served  -0.018  0.021  0.001  0.035  -0.198*** 
  (0.019)  (0.023)  (0.014)  (0.063)  (0.063) 
Out-group*Time Served  -0.024  -0.008  -0.037**  -0.028  0.013 
  (0.023)  (0.028)  (0.018)  (0.068)  (0.063) 
Penalty  -0.007  0.020**  -0.004  0.006  -0.029 
  (0.009)  (0.008)  (0.006)  (0.026)  (0.027) 
High Security  -0.167  -0.721**  0.133  -0.294  1.423 
  (0.308)  (0.332)  (0.205)  (1.026)  (1.059) 
Married  0.045  -0.184  0.147  0.289  -0.154 
  (0.126)  (0.192)  (0.091)  (0.457)  (0.471) 
Number of Cell Mates  -0.099**  -0.026  -0.030  0.120  0.141 
  (0.039)  (0.048)  (0.027)  (0.135)  (0.139) 
Age  0.002  -0.011  -0.007  0.052**  -0.015 
  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.005)  (0.026)  (0.026) 
Education  -0.045  -0.103  -0.005  0.012  -0.400
* 
  (0.062)  (0.087)  (0.046)  (0.228)  (0.235) 
Number of Children  0.043  0.073  0.020  -0.282
*  -0.090 
  (0.037)  (0.083)  (0.033)  (0.160)  (0.165) 
Number of Siblings  0.019
*  -0.029  -0.009  0.050  -0.030 
  (0.011)  (0.022)  (0.009)  (0.046)  (0.047) 
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Drug Related Offences  -0.167  0.055  0.210**  -0.241  0.684 
  (0.117)  (0.135)  (0.084)  (0.421)  (0.435) 
Smuggling Goods  0.805*  0.351*  -0.046  -0.906  1.573* 
  (0.428)  (0.211)  (0.161)  (0.807)  (0.832) 
Human Trafficking  -0.071  -0.128  0.220*  -0.602  0.265 
  (0.157)  (0.256)  (0.121)  (0.608)  (0.627) 
Homicide  0.825  -0.839**  0.315  0.714  1.569 
  (0.532)  (0.422)  (0.318)  (1.595)  (1.645) 
Sexual Crime  -0.156  0.261  -0.021  1.092  0.153 
  (0.277)  (0.433)  (0.214)  (1.074)  (1.108) 
Economic Crime  0.195  0.105  0.075  -1.475**  0.496 
  (0.185)  (0.263)  (0.139)  (0.698)  (0.721) 
Firearms violations  0.305  -0.308  -0.020  -1.436*  1.025 
  (0.202)  (0.405)  (0.167)  (0.836)  (0.863) 
N 118 102 92 84 210 186 210 186 210 186 
Priming + Out-group* Priming  0.408*** 0.349** 0.297** 0.293* 0.157* 0.152 0.057 -0.123 0.386 0.712 
Out-group + Out-group* Priming 0.125 0.268* -0.160 -0.140 -0.105 0.067 0.334 0.431 -0.018 -0.181 
Time Served + Out-group*Time 
Served 
n/a -0.042** n/a 0.013 n/a -0.037*** n/a 0.006 n/a -0.185*** 
Notes: All specifications are estimated with linear probability models and include subject random effects. Standard errors in parantheses. Independent 
variables as defined in the text and in footnote 16. Last three rows present joint coefficients and significance levels for tests on the restriction that the 
respective joint coefficient is equal to zero. N varies across specifications depending on the number of available observations (59 inmates as first 
movers, 46 inmates as second movers in the TG; data on control variables for some inmates missing in full specifications). *, **, *** indicates 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively. 
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6. Discussion and conclusion 
This paper presents evidence on the social behavior of prison inmates, with the aim of 
characterizing this behavior and also of evaluating a priming intervention and its potential to 
promote a positive rehabilitation effect. We have run economic experiments with a sample of 
105 inmates in a low- and a high security prison in Greece. We have provided a general 
landscape of inmates’ social behavior and studied how this varies between the in-group of 
inmates and the out-group of people outside prison, finding substantial evidence of 
discrimination expressed in lower rates of reciprocity and cooperation towards the out-group. 
Furthermore, we have used a simple priming technique that asks inmates to reflect on their time 
spent in prison and how it has affected them: the results indicate that this priming intervention 
has a substantial impact on inmates’ choices, generally promoting pro-social behavior towards 
the out-group and eliminating discrimination. 
 We believe that our findings can be very useful to policy makers who are in charge of 
evaluating the impact of incarceration on social behavior and the likelihood of successful post-
release re-integration, especially in light of the controversy surrounding the way that prisons 
affect inmates during and after incarceration. While our results generally point towards a 
negative effect of time spent in prison on pro-social behavior (evinced by lower cooperation 
rates when interacting with the out-group and by lower y-scores), the strong positive effect of 
our priming intervention suggests that rehabilitation can be promoted with help of the 
appropriate instruments. We have evaluated one such instrument and documented some very 
encouraging results – which are, however, subject to a number of limitations discussed in what 
follows. 
 What are possible channels driving the positive effect of the priming intervention in our 
study? The reasoning behind our hypothesis H2 proposes a mechanism based on concerns for 
group reputation, which are stronger in the priming treatment that enhances the participants’ 
identification with the prisoner group. We have already shown that the prisoner’s identity 
significantly increases in strength as a result of priming, which is consistent with our story. 
However, further possible mechanisms for the effect of priming should be acknowledged. First, 
it seems plausible that emotions evoked by the priming task may be driving the effects. For 
instance, the pattern we observe in the data (stronger identification with the prisoners’ group 
and stronger pro-sociality towards the out-group in the priming treatment) seems quite 
reasonable if identification with the in-group is associated with generally negative feelings and 
experiences, such that inmates who are asked to reflect about their time in prison regret sharing 
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this particular identity and become more inclined to behave benevolently towards the group 
from outside prison (for instance, in an attempt to shed this criminal identity, or to partly 
compensate for previous criminal behavior). Referring to the content analysis presented in 
section 3, this interpretation is in line with the much higher frequency of primed inmates’ 
accounts of their time in prison being classified as generally negative, compared to the neutral 
group accounts (50% vs. 8.5%; χ2 = 20.33, p < 0.01, N = 101). 
In a similar vein, the positive effect of priming on pro-social behavior towards the out-
group may be associated with subordination towards the depriving out-group (Giles and 
Powesland, 1975). If inmates consider society as a depriving out-group, then they may develop 
a stronger inclination to behave benevolently towards this group when their prisoner’s identity 
is made more salient. This explanation is supported by the presence of reverse discrimination 
among primed inmates in the dimensions of trust and benevolence under disadvantageous 
inequality.   
A final possibility is that the priming intervention evokes among inmates the 
rehabilitation effect that it aims to test. For instance, introspection may lead inmates to consider 
the purpose that their incarceration is meant to serve, and to realize that imprisonment can only 
be meaningful if it can lead to successful re-integration by modifying pro- and antisocial 
behavior. A related interpretation suggests that the effects of priming are driven by a social 
desirability bias: if inmates understand that the intervention is meant to test their rehabilitation, 
they may adjust their choices to fit the expected pattern of successful rehabilitation and 
increased pro-sociality towards the out-of-prison sample. Regardless of the precise mechanism 
driving our findings, the fact that the intervention works is very encouraging and suggests that 
perhaps further, related interventions, may have the capacity to modify inmates’ behavior.  
Given that participation in the experiments was voluntary, issues of selection into the 
sample may potentially play a role. In order to alleviate such concerns and assess the extent to 
which our sample is representative of the general prison population, we compare certain 
observable characteristics in our sample and among all prisoners in Greece and in the United 
States. The first characteristic is the distribution of nationalities, differentiating between Greeks 
and foreigners. For this analysis we use data from the Greek Ministry of Justice, Transparency 
and Human Rights24 and find that in our sample, as well as in the prison population in Greece 
as a whole, foreigners are a majority (70% and 58%, respectively). The second characteristic is 
                                                 
24 Available at http://www.ministryofjustice.gr/site/en/PenitentiarySystem/Statisticaldataondetainees.aspx; 
accessed November 2017. 
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the type of crime committed by inmates, for which we have no suitable data for Greek prisons 
and therefore use U.S. data from the Federal Bureau of Prisons.25 Table A4 in Appendix A 
shows that the distribution of crime categories is similar between our sample and the U.S. 
aggregate data, although it should be taken into account that the definitions of various categories 
do not completely overlap. Finally, from the same source we have data on the mean age of 
prisoners in the U.S. (38.4 years), which is very similar to the average age of 36 years in our 
sample. 
The experimental methods used in this study inevitably suffer from certain limitations, 
thus only allowing us to draw indirect evidence on our research questions. The data are based 
on behavior in simple economic games, which is only a proxy for criminal or pro-social 
behavior in the field. Moreover, behavior is recorded before release from prison, meaning that 
the evidence on how inmates treat non-inmates refers to a point in time prior to actual 
encounters between the two groups. It should also be kept in mind that, given imperfections in 
the legal system, it cannot be ruled out that some of the inmates in our sample have been 
wrongly convicted. 
An additional limitation of our study is that it paints a static picture of inmates’ behavior, 
documenting their behavior at one point in time and using econometric techniques in order to 
estimate an effect of time spent in prison on behavior. Relatedly, we cannot be sure about the 
extent to which the strong positive effects of priming documented in our experiment persist in 
the long run, given that priming effects are often short-lived. An alternative method could thus 
be to identify the effect of imprisonment and of priming interventions by following inmates 
over time and documenting changes in their behavior during their sentence as well as after their 
release from prison. While this can be challenging due to issues of attrition over time and biases 
resulting from repeated measurement of social preferences, we consider it a very promising 
avenue for future research. 
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APPENDIX A 
1. Comparison between inmates and students 
We begin by noting that we observe some similarities between the two samples, since around 
30% of participants have a Greek nationality and the rest have a variety of nationalities 
dominated by Arab and Eastern European countries (proportion of Greek prisoners: 29.5% in 
prisons vs. 24.5% in MAICH; χ2 = 0.06, p = 0.81, N = 145). On the other hand, a difference 
is that participants are on average older among the inmate population: mean age in the student 
group is 26.77 (s.d. = 5.18) and in the group of inmates it is 35.97 (s.d.=9.47). In any case, we 
are presenting evidence from two different cohorts of the population, not only in terms of 
certain sociodemographic features, but also due to obvious differences in life experiences and 
in particular the current social and professional situation. Thus, our rationale when comparing 
the two samples is not to isolate or causally estimate some sort of ‘prison’ effect; the purpose 
of this exercise is solely to show how the behavior of our focus group of prison inmates 
compares to a type of population typically studied in economic experiments (a student sample), 
and sharing a few common features with the prison population (close interactions among 
participants who eat, sleep and work together in the study site; similar distribution of 
nationalities; geographic proximity). 
Figure A1 shows the results from the trust game. Overall, inmates trust significantly 
less than students (42.4% vs. 60%; χ2 = 3.73, p = 0.05, N = 158). They also exhibit 
somewhat less reciprocal behavior as second movers, but the difference is not significant (χ2 =
2.41, p = 0.12, N = 132). 
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Figure A1: Inmates’ and students’ decisions in the TG. Trust is measured as percentage of 
first movers who choose to trust in the TG; reciprocity is measured as percentage of second 
movers who choose to reciprocate in the TG. Bars include 95% confidence intervals. 
 
Figure A2 shows the results from the prisoner’s dilemma. The frequency of cooperative 
choices is very similar across the two samples; 43.33% of inmates and 40% of our student group 
cooperate. These proportions are statistically indistinguishable from each other (χ2 = 0.26, p =
0.61, N = 290). 
 
 
Figure A2: Inmates’ and students’ decisions in the PD. Bars show cooperation rates and 
include 95% confidence intervals. 
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Finally, Figure A3 gives clear evidence that the distribution of distributional preference 
types differ between the two samples. While approximately 20% of inmates and students are 
classified as spiteful (χ2 = 0.08, p = 0.93, N = 290), inmates are about half as likely as 
students to be classified as altruistic (14.3% vs. 28.8%; χ2 = 6.61, p = 0.01, N = 290), 
indicating lower benevolence. Similarly, the ratio of inequality averse subjects is slightly 
significantly higher among students than among inmates (χ2 = 3.25, p = 0.07, N = 290). As 
already noted, a striking feature of the distribution of types among prisoners is the very high 
prevalence of inequality loving types, which is more than six times higher than among students 
(χ2 = 22.09, p = 0.01, N = 290),  
Figure A3: Inmates’ and students’ classification of types (Spiteful, Altruistic, Inequality 
Averse, Inequality Loving) in the EET. Bars show the percentage of subjects classified into 
each type and include 95% confidence intervals. 
 
The following result summarizes the observed differences in the social behavior of 
inmates compared to the group of students.  
Result A1: Inmates trust less and are less altruistic, less inequality averse and more 
inequality loving than students. No significant differences between the two samples are found 
in cooperation and reciprocity rates. 
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2. Additional tables  
 
Table A1: Distribution of language of instructions and of the priming text 
Language N %   N %   N % 
Instructions         
ARABIC 20 19.05   7 14.58   13 22.81 
ENGLISH 6 5.71   3 6.25   3 5.26 
FRENCH 2 1.90   2 4.17   0 0.00 
GREEK 77 73.33   36 75.00   41 71.93 
Priming text            
ARABIC 26 24.76   12 25.00   14 24.56 
ENGLISH 6 5.71   4 8.33   2 3.51 
GREEK 65 61.90   29 60.42   36 63.16 
SPANISH 5 4.76   1 2.08   4 7.02 
TURKISH 1 0.95   0 0.00   1 1.75 
URDU 2 1.90   2 4.17   0 0.00 
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Table A2: Econometric analysis with discrete choice models 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
  Trust Trust Recipr. Recipr. Cooper. Cooper. x-score x-score y-score y-score 
Out-group -0.707* -0.351 -1.823*** -1.574*** -1.162*** -0.705** -0.132 -0.005 0.153 0.021 
 (0.391) (0.502) (0.537) (0.552) (0.304) (0.345) (0.246) (0.312) (0.274) (0.335) 
Priming 0.166 -0.140 -0.345 -0.158 -0.373 -0.448 -0.338 -0.344 0.506 0.718** 
 (0.354) (0.428) (0.435) (0.479) (0.274) (0.288) (0.307) (0.319) (0.372) (0.366) 
Out-group*Priming 1.047** 1.299** 1.365** 1.103 0.869** 0.968** 0.404 0.318 -0.143 -0.162 
 (0.516) (0.585) (0.631) (0.673) (0.384) (0.413) (0.340) (0.361) (0.368) (0.392) 
Time Served  -0.055  0.075  0.002  0.0115  -0.138*** 
  (0.060)  (0.079)  (0.038)  (0.043)  (0.049) 
Out-group*Time Served  -0.105  -0.047  -0.136**  -0.013  0.011 
  (0.084)  (0.099)  (0.059)  (0.050)  (0.054) 
Penalty  -0.033  0.087**  -0.011  0.007  -0.027 
  (0.032)  (0.042)  (0.014)  (0.017)  (0.021) 
High Security  -0.583  -3.062*  0.352  -0.408  1.694* 
  (0.962)  (1.584)  (0.554)  (0.713)  (0.988) 
Married  0.182  -0.721  0.446*  0.231  -0.165 
  (0.374)  (0.616)  (0.265)  (0.295)  (0.342) 
Number of Cell Mates  -0.338***  -0.056  -0.099  0.088  0.115 
  (0.131)  (0.147)  (0.075)  (0.090)  (0.105) 
Age  0.014  -0.041  -0.021  0.035**  -0.014 
  (0.024)  (0.025)  (0.015)  (0.017)  (0.019) 
Education  -0.154  -0.308  -0.0183  -0.012  -0.372** 
  (0.187)  (0.276)  (0.134)  (0.152)  (0.180) 
Number of Children  0.108  0.258  0.0513  -0.208**  -0.035 
  (0.116)  (0.268)  (0.099)  (0.104)  (0.116) 
Number of Siblings  0.065*  -0.092  -0.034  0.043  -0.025 
  (0.039)  (0.073)  (0.030)  (0.032)  (0.033) 
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Drug Related Offences  -0.592  0.239  0.610**  -0.220  0.657** 
  (0.384)  (0.421)  (0.240)  (0.278)  (0.328) 
Smuggling Goods    1.101*  -0.109  -0.758  2.105** 
    (0.637)  (0.466)  (0.562)  (0.879) 
Human Trafficking  -0.197  -0.685  0.650*  -0.536  0.233 
  (0.526)  (0.815)  (0.357)  (0.425)  (0.501) 
Homicide  3.224  -3.776  0.951  0.236  1.391 
  (2.113)  (2.670)  (0.866)  (1.003)  (1.175) 
Sexual Crime  -0.439  0.768  0.0240  0.657  0.166 
  (0.821)  (1.374)  (0.571)  (0.689)  (0.745) 
Economic Crime  0.589  0.378  0.206  -1.283**  0.593 
  (0.558)  (0.788)  (0.398)  (0.547)  (0.564) 
Firearms violations  0.825    -0.187  -1.024*  0.590 
  (0.643)    (0.496)  (0.578)  (0.658) 
N 118 100 92 82 210 186 210 186 210 186 
Priming + Out-group* Priming  1.213*** 1.159** 1.020** 0.945* 0.496* 0.520 0.066 -0.026 0.363 0.556 
Out-group + Out-group* Priming  0.340 0.948** -0.458 -0.471 -0.293 0.263 0.272 0.313 0.01 -0.141 
Time Served + Out-group*Time 
Served 
n/a -0.159** n/a 0.029 n/a -0.134*** n/a -0.001 n/a -0.126*** 
 
Notes: Columns (1)-(6) present estimates from Probit regressions; columns (7)-(10) present estimates from ordered Probit regressions. Standard errors in 
parentheses. All specifications include subject random effects. Independent variables as defined in the text and in footnote 16. Last three rows present p values from 
tests on the restriction that the respective joint coefficient is equal to zero. N varies across specifications depending on the number of available observations (59 
inmates as first movers, 46 inmates as second movers in the TG; data on control variables for some inmates missing in full specifications). Coefficient on Smuggling 
Goods missing in (2) since there were only two inmates in the role of the trustor and with that particular offence, leading this variable to perfectly predict success 
in the Probit model. *, **, *** indicates statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively. 
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Table A3: Two-stage least squares estimation 
  1 2 3 4 5 
  Trust Reciprocity Cooperation x-score y-score 
Out-group -0.041 -0.657
*** -0.270** 0.451 -0.693 
 (0.164) (0.195) (0.129) (0.583) (0.595) 
Priming -0.003 0.017 -0.152 -0.555 0.934
** 
 (0.130) (0.159) (0.097) (0.438) (0.447) 
Out-group*Priming 0.369
** 0.249 0.303** 0.434 -0.226 
 (0.165) (0.210) (0.130) (0.589) (0.602) 
Time Served 0.004 -0.075 -0.011 0.181 -0.435
*** 
 (0.029) (0.062) (0.025) (0.115) (0.117) 
Out-group*Time Served -0.042 0.070 -0.027 -0.160 0.227
* 
 (0.028) (0.055) (0.026) (0.119) (0.121) 
Penalty -0.006 0.0160
* -0.004 0.009 -0.033 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.005) (0.022) (0.022) 
High Security -0.188 -0.760
** 0.130 -0.250 1.352 
 (0.277) (0.316) (0.186) (0.841) (0.859) 
Married 0.068 -0.345
* 0.137 0.420 -0.369 
 (0.115) (0.207) (0.085) (0.385) (0.393) 
Number of Cell Mates -0.095
*** -0.034 -0.030 0.125 0.132 
 (0.036) (0.045) (0.024) (0.111) (0.113) 
Age 0.002 -0.004 -0.006 0.050
** -0.011 
 (0.007) (0.009) (0.005) (0.021) (0.021) 
Education -0.064 -0.127 -0.003 -0.025 -0.340
* 
 (0.059) (0.084) (0.042) (0.189) (0.193) 
Number of Children 0.036 0.108 0.021 -0.297
** -0.066 
 (0.034) (0.081) (0.029) (0.131) (0.134) 
Number of Siblings 0.017
* -0.022 -0.009 0.045 -0.022 
 (0.010) (0.021) (0.008) (0.037) (0.038) 
Drug Related Offences -0.167 0.126 0.212
*** -0.271 0.733** 
 (0.105) (0.135) (0.076) (0.346) (0.353) 
Smuggling Goods 0.839
** 0.280 -0.060 -0.718 1.268* 
 (0.387) (0.205) (0.149) (0.673) (0.687) 
Human Trafficking -0.112 -0.145 0.230
** -0.734 0.480 
 (0.147) (0.243) (0.112) (0.506) (0.517) 
Homicide 0.704 -0.769
* 0.336 0.434 2.025 
 (0.494) (0.402) (0.291) (1.320) (1.348) 
Sexual Crime -0.203 0.114 -0.018 1.051 0.220 
 (0.254) (0.421) (0.194) (0.880) (0.899) 
Economic Crime 0.182 0.244 0.0834 -1.584
*** 0.672 
 (0.167) (0.264) (0.127) (0.577) (0.589) 
Firearms violations 0.249 -0.387 -0.004 -1.650
** 1.374* 
 (0.190) (0.387) (0.155) (0.700) (0.715) 
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N 102 84 186 186 186 
Priming + Out-group* Priming 0.366*** 0.266* 0.151 -0.121 0.708 
Out-group + Out-group* Priming  0.328** -0.408* 0.033 0.885 -0.919 
Time Served + Out-group*Time Served -0.038** -0.005 -0.038*** 0.021 -0.208*** 
Sargan’s Test of overidentifying 
restrictions 
p=0.360 p=0.382 p=0.138 p=0.931 p=0.904 
Wu-Hausman test of endogeneity p=0.386 p=0.105 p=0.637 p=0.157 p=0.020 
 
Notes: Instrumented variable: Time Served. Used instruments: frequency of leaving prison (days per 
month), working days per month. Standard errors in parantheses. Independent variables as defined in 
the text and in footnote 16. Last three rows present p values from tests on the restriction that the 
respective joint coefficient is equal to zero. N varies across specifications depending on the number of 
available observations (59 inmates as first movers, 46 inmates as second movers in the TG; data on 
control variables and instruments for some inmates missing). *, **, *** indicates statistical significance 
at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively. 
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Table A4: Distribution of crime categories in our sample and among U.S. prison 
population (Source: Federal Bureau of Prisons) 
Our sample U.S. prison population 
Category % of total  % of total 
Drug related 35.0 Drug offenses 46.3 
Robbery 29.3 
Burglary, Larceny, Property Offenses, 
Robbery 
8.5 
Homicide 5.7 
Homicide, Aggravated Assault, and 
Kidnapping Offenses 
3.2 
Sexual crime 2.4 Sex offenses 9.1 
Economic crime + 
smuggling goods 
11.4 
Banking and Insurance, Counterfeit, 
Embezzlement, Extortion, Fraud, 
Bribery 
6.7 
Firearms violations 5.7 Weapons, Explosives, Arson 17.2 
Others (Smuggling 
goods, human 
trafficking) 
10.6 
Continuing Criminal Enterprise, 
Courts or corrections, Immigrations, 
National Security, Miscellaneous 
9.0 
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3. Decisions among students, in-group vs. out-group 
 
 
 
Figure A4: Decisions in the TG taken by students. Trust is measured as the percentage of first 
movers who choose to trust in the TG; reciprocity is measured as the percentage of second 
movers who choose to reciprocate in the TG. Bars include 95% confidence intervals. 
 
 
 
 
Figure A5: Decisions in the PD taken by students. Bars indicate cooperation rates and include 
95% confidence intervals. 
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Figure A6: Classification of students’ types (Spiteful, Altruistic, Inequality Averse, Inequality 
Loving) in the EET. Bars show the percentage of subjects classified into each type and include 
95% confidence intervals. 
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